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Abstract:  
Dual-process theories propose two types of cognitive process -Type1 heuristic 
processing and Type2 analytic processing - that underlie belief biased reasoning. 
Previous studies have shown neural correlates of these types of processing, but the 
effect of logical training on neural activation in belief bias remains unclear. 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) was used to investigate the brain 
activity associated with response change in a belief bias paradigm before and after 
logic training. Participants completed two sets of belief biased reasoning tasks. In the 
first set they were instructed to respond based on their empirical beliefs, and in the 
second - following logic training - they were instructed to respond logically. The 
comparison between conflict problems in the second scan versus in the first scan 
revealed differing activation for the left inferior frontal gyrus, left middle frontal 
gyrus, cerebellum, and precuneus. The scan was time locked to the presentation of the 
minor premise, and thus demonstrated effects of belief-logic conflict on neural 
activation earlier in the time course than has previously been shown in fMRI. These 
data, moreover, indicated that logical training results in changes in brain activity 
associated with cognitive control processing which is a form of Type2 processing. It 
is argued that this evidence favors a dual-process theory of belief-bias rather than a 
single process account. 
Key words: Dual-process; Belief-bias; Logical training; Inhibition; Event-related 
fMRI 
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Introduction 
When we discuss sports, politics or religion our beliefs have an influence on the 
arguments we are willing to accept. Beliefs (in this context our empirical knowledge 
about the world) have also been shown to have a profound effect on the inferences 
that people make in the lab (Evans, Barston & Pollard, 1983). In deductive reasoning 
(the process of inferring logically valid conclusions from premises), the belief-bias 
effect is that reasoners typically accept more believable conclusions than unbelievable 
conclusions, but also accept more logically valid conclusions than invalid. These 
factors interact such that performance on problems where belief and logic are 
consistent is superior to belief-neutral problems, however, participants have 
considerable difficulty where there is a belief-logic conflict Error! Reference source 
not found.. Dual-process theories attempt to explain the observed phenomenon by 
proposing two types of cognitive process underlying belief-bias Error! Reference 
source not found.. Type 1 processing, entails rapid belief-driven heuristics; whereas, 
Type 2 processing, entails slower analytic responding Error! Reference source not 
found.. Where there is a belief-logic conflict these fast and slow processes compete, 
with slower responses correlating with increased logical responding Error! 
Reference source not found..   
  Dual-process theories such as these have been investigated through many 
behavioral studies, which have identified some basic principles of the two cognitive 
processes. For example, studies have demonstrated robust effects of response patterns, 
response times (increased response times to problems where logic and belief are in 
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conflict), and confidence ratings (feelings of 'rightness' predict rethinking times to 
reach logical conclusions) within the belief-bias paradigm Error! Reference source 
not found. which are well explained by dual-process accounts. Moreover, De Neys 
(2006b) demonstrated reductions in logical responding for conflict problems when 
participants were under a concurrent working memory load, while Evans and 
Curtis-Holmes (2005) demonstrated increased belief driven responses under a rapid 
response condition. There is also a wealth of individual differences data that indicate 
thinking dispositions and working memory are supportive of dual process accounts of 
many higher level cognitive tasks (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2000). Neuroscientific 
methods, such as fMRI, functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS), repetitive 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS), and event-related potentials (ERPs) have 
made a valuable contribution to the area, demonstrating a range of findings consistent 
with the predictions of dual process theory Error! Reference source not found.. 
Using fMRI, researchers Error! Reference source not found. have found that 
the belief-bias effect is associated with increased activation of the right lateral 
prefrontal cortex (PFC). Tsujii and colleagues have also found the right lateral PFC 
was enhanced when participants gave logical responses to belief-logic conflict 
problems, thus corroborating fMRI studies with evidence from fNIRS and rTMS 
methodologies Error! Reference source not found.. Although the right lateral PFC 
appears to be activated by belief-logic conflict, participants in these studies Error! 
Reference source not found. did not receive any formal training in logic - in fact, 
participants are usually selected on the basis of having had no training in formal logic. 
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Using positron emission tomography (PET) to compare brain activity in trials before 
and after logical training (i.e., training people to inhibit matching bias), Houde´ and 
colleagues Error! Reference source not found. found that the left-prefrontal 
network and right ventromedial prefrontal cortex were engaged when participants 
successfully overcome matching bias in the Wason Selection Task. However, 
previous studies have not yet demonstrated whether effects of logical training can 
induce a similar change in reasoning strategy and neural activity in the belief bias 
paradigm. According to the results of previous studies, the reasoning process can start 
as soon as the premises are presented Error! Reference source not found., however, 
most fMRI studies have primarily focused on conclusion processing instead of on the 
processing of premises Error! Reference source not found.. Therefore, it is 
important to examine the processing of the premises using fMRI to test for 
corroborating evidence of belief-logic conflict effects at this early stage in premise 
presentation. 
To determine how brain functions change with logical training in belief-biased 
reasoning and to contribute to the discussion contrasting functional neuroanatomy and 
neuropedagogy (Houdé, 2008; Goel, 2008), we conducted an fMRI study in which the 
participants were scanned both before and after logical training. In the first scan, 
participants were required to respond to the belief-biased items (both conflict 
problems and non-conflict problems) in accordance with their empirical beliefs, 
however, in the second scan participants were required to respond in accordance with 
logic. It was hypothesized that the logical training would exert greater influence on 
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the conflict problems, because the participants would need to inhibit their 
belief-driven responding and engage in analytic processing.  
The present study aimed to determine (1) whether the pattern of brain activation 
associated with overcoming belief-bias through logical training is same as that of 
without logical training (Goel & Dolan, 2003), (2) whether Houdé et al.'s (2000) 
matching bias effect can be extended to a belief bias paradigm, and (3) whether these 
effects are observable earlier in the presentation of premises stimuli than has 
previously been shown in fMRI. Based on the previous studies Error! Reference 
source not found., it was hypothesized that the processing of reasoning in the second 
scan versus in the first scan will activate regions in the right lateral PFC and the 
left-prefrontal network (i.e., left inferior frontal gyrus). The supposition is that this 
contrast would be related to belief-bias inhibition after logical training. Most 
importantly, the extent to which the cortical systems underlying belief bias are plastic 
with respect to logical training was examined. 
  
Methods 
Participants  
Sixteen university students (eight men, aged 20–28 years; mean = 23.8 years; eight 
women, aged 20–26 years; mean = 23.0 years) from China were paid for their 
participation. They were selected on the basis of offering a belief-biased response to 
at least 70% of conditional reasoning problems where belief and logic conflicted (see 
Table 1) during a pre-test. All participants were right-handed, and with no reported 
neurological disorders, significant physical illness, head injury, or alcohol/drug abuse. 
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This study was approved by the local ethics committee of Shanghai Normal 
University, and all participants signed an informed consent form prior to their 
inclusion in the experiment. 
Design and Stimuli 
This study was organized into a 2*2 design. The first factor was the type of problem 
(see Table 1), consisting of 2 levels, conflict problems (in which the logical 
conclusion is inconsistent with one’s beliefs) and non-conflict problems (in which the 
logical conclusion is consistent with one’s beliefs). The second factor was logical 
training, consisting of 2 levels: naive participants prior to logical training and then 
post logic training. Specifically, participants were first required to perform the 
reasoning task without any logical training and were instructed to draw a conclusion 
based on their existing knowledge (or empirical beliefs) in the first scan, and were 
then asked to draw a conclusion based on logical rule after receiving a logical training 
in the second scan. Four conditions of stimuli were used in the experiment, namely 
belief-based instructions for non-conflict problems (BNC), belief-based instructions 
for conflict problems (BC), logic-based instructions for non-conflict problems (LNC), 
and logic-based instructions for conflict problems (LC). Each condition contained 120 
items, encompassing 4 different conditional reasoning forms- Modus Tollens (MT), 
Denial of the Antecedent (DA), Modus Ponens (MP), and Affirmation of the 
Consequent (AC). Each form contained 30 items. The 240 items used during the first 
scan were the same as in the second scan.  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Procedure 
Items were presented in the following way (see Fig.1) during both scans: Each trial 
was initiated by a “+” in the center of screen for 0.5 s. The major premise (e.g., If a 
number can be divided by 2, then it is an even number) was then presented for 3.5 s. 
A blank screen was presented for a randomly varying duration of between 2 and 6 s, 
which was then followed by the minor premise (e.g., the number is not an even 
number), which was presented for 4s. During this time participants were required to 
draw a conclusion based on the premises. A blank screen was presented for a 
randomly varying duration of between 2 and 6 s, which was then followed by three 
possible options (see Table 1) to select from for 2 s. At this time, participants were 
asked to indicate which option was consistent with the conclusion they inferred (by 
pressing “1” if their own conclusion was consistent with the option 1, pressing “2” if 
they select the option 2, pressing “3” if they select the option 3). In order to 
familiarize the subjects with the procedure of this task, subjects were trained with 8 
trials (2 trials for each reasoning forms) in the same procedure before the first scan. 
During the first scan, participants were instructed to draw a conclusion based on their 
empirical beliefs.  
   Participants then received several blocks of logical training. Each block contained 
4 conditional reasoning forms (each form consisted of 5 items). The training 
procedure was the same as during scanning except that participants were given 
feedback (based on the logical rule) as to whether the response was right or wrong for 
each item. After each block, the experimenter provided the participants with the valid 
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responses for their erroneous responses. Furthermore, the experimenter explained why 
the answers were invalid and taught explained how to avoid the false conclusion. 
Participants whose accuracy rates in every conditional reasoning form were greater 
than 80% in a block were allowed to begin the second scan. All 16 participants met 
the criteria for continuing the test. The items used in training were differing from the 
test scan. During the second scan, participants were required to draw a logical 
conclusion based on logical rules. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Imaging Data Acquisition 
Imaging Data were collected by a 3 Tesla Siemens Magnetom Trio MRI scanner 
(Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany). High-resolution T1-weighted 
anatomical images were acquired for each participant (voxel size= 1 mm×1 mm×1 
mm). And Functional data were acquired using a T2-weighted gradient echo planar 
imaging (EPI) sequence (repetition time (TR) = 2,000 ms; echo time (TE) = 30 ms; 
matrix size: 64×64; field of view (FOV) = 220mm×220mm; flip angle = 90 
degrees).  
Imaging Data Analyses 
Image preprocessing and statistical analysis were performed using SPM8 (Welcome 
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). There 
were five dummy scans removed from further analysis. Functional EPI images were 
slice-time corrected using sinc-interpolation and realigned to first volume to correct 
for head movement. The structural volume was coregistered to the mean functional 
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image and segmented into gray and white-matter probability maps. The segmented 
structural images were then spatially normalized to the MNI template and the derived 
normalization parameters were applied to the realigned functional data. Finally, 
functional images were spatially smoothed with an 8-mm full-width at half-maximum 
(FWHM) isotropic Gaussian kernel. Low-frequency drift in the BOLD signal was 
removed by a high-pass filter with a cutoff value of 128 s.  
Individual analysis of imaging data was conducted using the general linear 
model implemented in SPM8. The model included task effects, a mean and linear drift 
for each of the 5 functional runs and 6 motion parameters. Task effects were 
comprised of BNC, BC, LNC, and LC. These were constructed by convolving 
condition-specific boxcar functions with a synthetic hemodynamic response function. 
In both scans, the BOLD responses of minor premise are of interest, however, these 
responses are based on differing instructions on how to respond. The major-premise, 
the conclusion, and the error trials were also included as non-interest regressors which 
were excluded from the analyses. The four parametric contrast images (BNC, BC, 
LNC, and LC), were calculated separately for each participant. They were submitted 
to a 2 × 2 analyses of variance (ANOVA) with the factors of problem type 
(belief-logic conflict problems versus non-conflict problems) and logical training 
(prior to logical training in the first scan and after logical training in the second scan) 
for all participants using a random effect model. All whole-brain univariate analyses 
were thresholded at p< 0.001 (uncorrected) with more than 50 extent voxels. Only 
clusters significant at p< 0.05 corrected using family-wise error (FWE) (Worsley, et 
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al., 1996) are reported unless otherwise specified. 
Results 
Behavioral data 
Only items to which the participants responded based on the instructions were 
classified as accurate responses (i.e., belief-based responses in the first scan and logic 
based responses in the second scan). The accuracy rates and mean reaction times for 
the conclusion response during BNC, BC, LNC, and LC are shown in Table2.  
   It should be noted that the accuracy rates for conflict problems in the first scan (in 
which the belief-based responses classified as accurate responses) were 75%. Thus, if 
the logic based responses had been classified as accurate responses, the accuracy rates 
for conflict problems would have been below 25% in the first scan. In the second scan, 
in which the participants had received logical training, the accuracy rates of logically 
correct answers for conflict problems were 79%. From this perspective, the 
mean-accuracy rates based on the logical rules for the conflict problems increased 
significantly (t (15) = 7.102, p < 0.0001). 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
fMRI data 
The ANOVA results showed that the main effect of logical training was associated 
with activation of the left inferior frontal gyrus, left middle frontal gyrus, cerebellum, 
and precuneus. Neither the main effect of the type of problem, nor the interaction 
between the type and the logical training were significant.  
Through contrasting the LC and BC, the fMRI data showed that left inferior 
frontal gyrus (BA47), left inferior frontal gyrus (BA44/45), left middle frontal 
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gyrus(BA6), cerebellum, precuneus / posterior cingulate cortex (BA31) were 
activated (see Figure 2). These increased activations were consistent with the main 
effect of logical training. The opposite contrast (BC minus LC) showed no reliable 
difference in activation.  
The comparison between conflict problems in the second scan versus in the first 
scan (i.e., LC versus BC) was the primary focus of the present study, nonetheless 
contrasts between non-conflict problems were examined. Direct comparison between 
LNC and BNC revealed a significant increase in neural activation in precuneus. The 
opposite contrast (BNC minus LNC) showed that anterior cingulate showed increased 
activation. Additionally, the contrast (BNC versus BC) and the contrast (LNC versus 
LC) showed no reliable difference in activation. 
Masking 
LC>BC: In order to rule out the possibility that the same areas are activated by BC, 
we conducted exclusive masking on the results from the BC condition to the LC>BC 
contrast. The pattern of results (mask threshold at p<0.001 uncorrected) remained 
consistent with that observed in the LC>BC contrast. Therefore, the observed 
activations of the left inferior frontal gyrus, left inferior frontal gyrus, left middle 
frontal gyrus, cerebellum, precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex are not observed 
during belief-based reasoning. 
       INSERT FIGURE 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
Discussion 
This study investigated the neural basis of strategy change during belief-biased 
reasoning processes (e.g., conflict problems and non-conflict problems) using a logic 
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training manipulation. Participants whose dominant responses were based on their 
beliefs were trained to change their belief response into logical response in the two 
successive sessions. 
    The behavioral data showed that the accuracy rates of conflict problems based on 
the logical rules increased significantly (i.e., below 25% versus 79%) while there was 
no effect on non-conflict problems (i.e., they were equally solved before and after the 
training with 91% accuracy). These data demonstrate that the combination of the 
training manipulation and logic based instructions were successful in bringing 
participants’ responses into alignment with the logical answers. These data are 
consistent with a change in reasoning strategy; however, there are alternative 
explanations that warrant further study. The increase in accuracy rates may be the 
result of a general practice effect, or some combination of the logic based instructions 
and logic training – future investigations should attempt to discount these alternative 
explanations. Nonetheless, the resultant differences in neural activation across the 
conflict problems are, therefore, the focal point of our discussion. 
Functional MRI revealed that drawing a logical conclusion for the conflict 
problems in the second scan involved significantly greater activation in a left frontal 
network- including the left inferior frontal gyrus and left middle frontal gyrus, 
cerebellum, and precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex than drawing a conclusion based 
on their belief in the first scan. This result indicates that combination of logical 
training and logic instructions induced a change in responding, which produced 
changes in brain activity that were suggestive of qualitative differences between 
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belief-based processing and logic-based processing.  
The data obtained by Houde´ and colleagues (2000) revealed activation in the 
left-prefrontal network, left posterior-cingulate, the right ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, and right anterior cingulate. Consistent with Houde´ and colleagues' work, the 
present study also found that the left inferior frontal gyrus and left middle frontal 
gyrus were activated, however, the right prefrontal cortex was not activated in the 
present study. Two possible explanations for this discrepancy can be proposed. First, 
the findings of Houde´ and colleagues (2000) were reported in a block-design PET 
study that does not permit separate reading of the stimuli from the reasoning task 
Error! Reference source not found., whereas the present study directly focused on 
the stage of the minor premise with event-related fMRI. A second explanation could 
be that differences were driven by the differing sources of bias. Houde´ et al. (2000) 
demonstrated training effects in the context of matching/perceptual bias whereas the 
reasoning items in the present study were belief-biased. Previous behavioral research 
has demonstrated differing patterns of correlations between response times and 
normative responding when comparing matching biased syllogisms and belief biased 
syllogisms (cf. Stupple, Ball & Ellis, 2013 and Stupple et al., 2011).  
Neuroscientific studies of deductive reasoning have shown that explanatory 
inference is mediated by the inferior frontal cortex (or ventrolateral PFC) 
corresponding to Brodmann's Areas 44, 45, and 47 and more specifically by the left 
inferior frontal cortex (Barbey & Patterson, 2011; Goel et al., 2000; Goel & Dolan, 
2004; Kroger et al.,2008; Monti et al.,2007; Noveck et al., 2004). In particular, the left 
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inferior frontal cortex is related to the process of detecting violations of norms and 
generating explanatory inferences about causality (Barbey & Patterson, 2011). For 
example, Berthoz et al (2002) provided evidence that the left inferior frontal cortex 
was recruited when participants detected violations of social norms and inhibited 
impulsive action (e.g., the decision to “spit out food made by the host”). Similarly, 
violations of empirical beliefs that conflict with the logical rule violate norms of basic 
empirical knowledge. Thus, the stronger activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus 
(BA44/45/47) for conflict problems in the second scan would support the 
hypothesized detection of the conflict between logic and belief, and inhibition of the 
belief-based process when participants were instructed to respond in accordance with 
logic. It has been consistently postulated that the left inferior frontal cortex has been 
shown to have a role in cognitive control Error! Reference source not found., and in 
the enabling of the inhibition of responses and the resisting of temptation.  
In contrast, evidence from fMRI, rTMS and fNIRS studies demonstrate that the 
inhibition of belief-bias is associated with increased activation of the right lateral PFC 
Error! Reference source not found.. The first possible explanation for this 
discrepancy is that the previous studies Error! Reference source not found. directly 
compared conflict problems and non-conflict problems, while the present study, with 
the use of a logical training manipulation, compared conflict problems between two 
scans. It is proposed that participants need to devote cognitive effort to inhibit their 
existing beliefs in order to apply their newly developed logic-based strategy. In this 
process, participants may first recall the logical rules from the training phase and then 
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apply them to shift from a belief-driven reasoning strategy to a logical reasoning 
strategy. From this perspective, the observed increased activation in the left inferior 
frontal gyrus is explicitly sensitive to the logical rule that has been learnt in training, 
and the resulting of conflict detection. 
 A second possible explanation is that the activation of the right lateral PFC, 
shown in Goel and Dolan Error! Reference source not found., might be involved 
the motor inhibition during the conclusion judgment stage, where participants indicate 
their response with a physical movement. In contrast, the left inferior frontal cortex in 
this study occurred during the presentation of the minor premise where no physical 
movement was required.  Collectively, the findings of several studies support that 
the right lateral PFC is thought to play a critical role in motor inhibition Error! 
Reference source not found.. This activation during the presentation of the minor 
premise is a notable contribution to the belief bias literature as it corroborates 
evidence from ERPs (Banks & Hope, 2014; Luo, et al., 2010; Luo, et al., 2008) 
indicating that belief-logic conflict may occur prior to the presentation of a conclusion 
with an alternative neuroscientific methodology.  
Another of the activated areas in the left-prefrontal network was the left middle 
frontal gyrus (BA6). Kalbfleisch, Van Meter, & Zeffiro (2007) demonstrated that the 
left BA6 supports processing related to the difficulty or complexity of the task, 
moreover, Houde´ and colleagues Error! Reference source not found. argued that 
the left BA 6 is likely to be related to cognitive inhibition of matching bias. Thus, the 
stronger activation in the left BA6 for conflict problems in the second scan might be 
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involved in the cognitive effort devoted to inhibiting an alternative heuristic response 
- based on belief - to engage a logical strategy. 
In addition to these differences in left frontal network activation, the conflict 
problems in the second scan relative to the first scan demonstrated contrasting 
activations in the cerebellum, and precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex (BA31). The 
cerebellum has previously been associated with the process of response reassignment 
Error! Reference source not found. in the second scan participants change from a 
belief-based response to a logic-based response, which is likely to be more analytic 
and more cognitively demanding Error! Reference source not found.. Increased 
activation of the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex (BA31) might be related to 
retrieving the inferential rules learnt during the training phase from memory Error! 
Reference source not found.. Further support for this can be found in the contrast 
between belief instructions and logic instructions for non-conflict problems, which 
also revealed activation in the precuneus / posterior cingulate cortex (BA31) albeit 
with a relatively small effect. The recall of inferential rules would occur for both 
conflict and non-conflict problems and the post logic training activation of these areas 
are consistent with that explanation. 
To summarize, this study investigated the neural correlates of reasoning response 
switching, contrasting belief-based responses with logic-based responses after logical 
training during belief biased reasoning. It was hypothesized that the logical training 
would specifically affect the conflict problems and changes in brain activity would be 
evidence of a training-induced change in reasoning strategy. The results showed that 
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the left inferior frontal gyrus (BA44/45/47), left middle frontal gyrus (BA6), 
cerebellum, and precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex (BA31) might be involved in 
cognitive inhibition of the belief-based process and switch to logic-based responding. 
We are mindful that these comparisons with previous studies demonstrating 
common loci of activation across differing tasks are reverse inferences (e.g., Poldrack, 
2006) and as such, are presented as tentative inductive conclusions; further research is 
required to replicate these patterns of activation using alternative belief bias materials 
and additional triangulating measures of behaviour. Further study also continues to be 
needed to assess precisely when and where the PFC is involved in problems where 
belief and logic conflict. Nonetheless, these data provide a useful contribution to the 
debate contrasting functional neuroanatomy and neuropedogogy and the role of the 
PFC in conflict detection (Houdé, 2008; Goel, 2008). 
This pattern of activation, nonetheless suggests that the combination of logical 
training, and the instruction to provide logical responses to a belief bias task, results in 
qualitatively different cognitive processes to those employed during belief-based 
responding rather than simply requiring an increased activation of a single process. As 
such, these data favor a dual process theory of belief bias (e.g., Stupple et al., 2011; 
Handley, Newstead & Trippas, 2011) rather than a single process account (e.g., Dube, 
Rotello & Heit, 2010). 
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Figure 1 Timeline of stimuli Blood-oxygen-level dependence (BOLD) responses of 
Minor premises were the target events to which the conditions of fMRI data were 
locked. 
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Figure 2 The neural activation (A: Inferior frontal gyrus (BA47), B: Inferior frontal 
gyrus (BA44/45), C: Middle frontal gyrus, D: Cerebellum, E: Precuneus) in the 
contrast of LC versus BC. 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
Figure 3 The neural activation (A: Precuneus) in the contrast of LNC versus BNC. 
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Table 1 Sample item of the study 
 
 
 
 
 
Table2 Mean (SD) of Accuracy Rates and Reaction Times for BNC, BC, LNC, and 
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Encompassing MT, DA, MP, and AC reasoning forms.  
Take MT form for example: 
Major premise: If a number can be divided by 2, then it is an even 
number 
Minor premise: The number is not an even number 
Option 1: The number can be divided by 2  
Option 2: The number cannot be divided by 2 (Logic and Belief-based 
response) 
Option 3:Whether the number can or not be divided by 2 is uncertain 
 
Take MP form for example: 
Major premise: If one’s answer is correct, then he will get score 
Minor premise: Somebody whose answer is correct 
Option 1: The person got score (Logic and Belief-based response) 
Option 2: The person did not get score 
Option 3:Whether the person got score or not is uncertain 
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Encompassing MT, DA, MP, and AC reasoning forms. 
Take DA form for example: 
Major premise: If the ball is thrown into the basket, then the point will be 
scored 
Minor premise: The ball was not thrown 
Option 1: The point was scored 
Option 2: The point was not scored (Belief-based response) 
Option 3: Whether the point was scored or not is uncertain (Logic-based 
response) 
 
Take AC form for example: 
Major premise: If somebody did not pass the exam, then he should 
make-up 
Minor premise: Somebody was given a make-up examination  
Option 1: The person passed the exam(Belief-based response) 
Option 2: The person did not pass the exam 
Option 3:It is uncertain whether the person passed the exam or not 
(Logic-based response) 
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LC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Coordinates of activation peaks  
 BNC BC LNC  LC 
Accuracy Rates (%)  91(9)  75(27) 91(14) 79(24) 
Reaction Times (ms) 808(177) 793(158) 761(173) 767(200) 
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a 
The resulting activations were computed by a voxel-wise intensity threshold of p < 0.05 using a 
correction of multiple comparisons via the family-wise error (FWE), and a cluster size of a 
minimum of fifty contiguous voxels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regions activated         Hem    BA      X     Y     Z     Cluster  Cluster Size 
p
a
      voxels(n) 
LC – BC 
Inferior frontal gyrus     L     47     -57   30   -3     0.001     236 
Inferior frontal gyrus     L    44/45   -54   15   12     0.020     128 
Middle frontal gyrus     L      6     -45   12   48     0.000     494 
Cerebellum            L             -9   -45  -27     0.000     585 
Precuneus             R      31     6   -66   15     0.000     285 
BC - LC  
No activation 
LNC - BNC  
Precuneus             L      31     -3   -75   24     0.004     226 
BNC - LNC  
Anterior cingulate      R       32     3    54    9     0.000     884   
